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Summary  findings
Labor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high  control for observable firm-specific effects. They test the
by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the  rent-sharing and hold-up theories of wage determination,
formal sector. Are they a brake on industrialization or  as well as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories.
the result of successful enterprise development? Are they  Their results lean in favor of both rent-sharing and
imposed on firms by powerful unions or government  hold-up, suggesting that workers have some bargaining
regulations, or a by-product of good firm performance?  power and that in C6te d'Ivoire workers can force
Azam and Ris empirically analyze what determines  renegotiation of labor contracts in response to new
manufacturing wages in Cote d'Ivoire, using an  investments.
unbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them to
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Labor costs in Francophone Africa are deemed high by the standards of low-income
countries,  at  least  in  the  formal  sector  (e.g.  Rama,  1996).  Are  they  a  brake  on
industrialization, or the result of successful enterprise development ? Are they imposed
on firms by powerful unions or government regulations, or are they a by-product of good
firms performance ? The consequences for the industrial development of these countries
are completely different depending on the answers given to these questions.
The issue of wage formation in the urban sector of less developed countries is a
recurrent theme in  the theory of economic development. Ever since Lewis's  seminal
paper (Lewis, 1954), a widely held view is that labor market  dualism is  a source of
inefficiency and  underdevelopment. Lewis  assumes  that  various  factors imply  that
modem sector wages are about 30 % higher than the opportunity wage, reducing the
profits on which the development of the capitalist sector feeds its expansion. In reality,
the wage gap is usually much higher than Lewis assumed. In the important contribution
by Harris and Todaro (1970), the urban wage is fixed institutionally at a high level, which
triggers rural-urban migration, and urban unemployment.  Hence, excessively high wages
in the 'capitalist'  (Lewis) or  'urban'  (Harris-Todaro) sector are widely regarded as an
obstacle to development.
However, the different brands of efficiency-wage theories have suggested that
high wages are in fact minimizing labor cost expressed in efficiency units',  and are thus
instrumental in making the firms profitable. More recently, the theory of rent sharing has
been developed to suggest that high wages include in fact a share of profits, and are thus
only a  reflection of  the good performances of  the firms (Blanchflower, Oswald and
Sanfey,  1996). Here again, the question arises whether the profit  element present in
workers' compensation is captured by them, as a result of insider effects (Nickell and
Wadhwani, 1990), or whether the firms engage in profit-sharing as part of their incentive
system. The latter assumption has not been discussed in the recent literature, but played
an important part in the mid-1980s (Weitzman, 1984). The appendix presents a simple
formal treatment of rent-sharing, showing the possible role of the bargaining power of the
workers. In  a  bargaining  framework, where  the workers have  the power  to  disrupt
production, then profit-sharing is a  feature of the equilibrium strategy of the firms to
ensure a positive level of output, which has no short-run allocative consequences.
In the case of Francophone  Africa, at least in the CFA Zone, various complicating
factors result from the special institutional features of the two CFA monetary unions,
including their privileged relationships with France. Van de Walle (1991) argues that this
institutional setting, together with the overvalued currency that resulted from it before the
devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, resulted in exceedingly high wages in the
urban formal sector of these countries, in termns  of foreign prices. According to Rama
I See Akerlof and Yellen (1986) for a comprehensive  collection of the most important papers in this
literature.
l(1996), a major determinant of these misaligned wages was the high level of wages in the
public sector, which play a leading part in the formal sector labor market. This supports
the widely held view that a contagion effect from public sector wages to other wages in
the formal sector is present, rather than the public employment level effect emphasized by
Lindauer (1991). Azam (1995) shows that the average wage of public employees, as a
ratio of per  capita GDP, was exceedingly high in  the West-African monetary union,
compared to  other African countries, suggesting that the  political power of the  civil
servants and other public employees, unfettered by any democratic control, was at the
heart of the problem. In C6te d'Ivoire in particular, in 1988, the average wage of a public
sector employee  was about ten times larger than GDP per capita.
However, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, two of the high-wage members of the West-
African monetary union, are also two of the most industrialized countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa, among the top ten performers in terms of their share of manufacturing in GDP in
1995 (World Bank, 1998). Did this happen despite high wage costs, or was it the cause of
high wages ? The aim of the present paper is to analyze this issue empirically, with the
help of survey data collected in C6te d'Ivoire in 1995 and 1996, and covering the years
2 1994 and  1995 . More than 270 firms were interviewed, most  of them twice, and a
sample of up to 10 employees were interviewed in each of them. This data set allows for
an analysis of wage determination in Cote d'Ivoire, using the type of methods developed
elsewhere. There is a wage-earners module, where employees give, beside their wage
level, many personal characteristics.  This feature makes it possible to combine individual
workers' data with some data about the firms in which they work.
The empirical analysis of wage determinants has received a new impetus in the
last decade, stimulated by the « rent-sharing  >) issue. In the 1980s, a lot of attention was
devoted  to  explaining inter-industry differences in  wage  rates,  unaccounted  for  by
workers personal characteristics (Krueger and Summers, 1988). However, it became clear
in the 1990s that there are inter-firms differences in wage schedules as well, even after
controlling  for  workers  personal  characteristics  and  sectoral  effects.  Nickell  and
Wadhwani  (1990),  Christophides and  Oswald  (1992), Konings  and  Walsh  (1994),
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996), for developed countries, and Morrison (1994)
and Teal (1996), for developing countries, are important contributions to this literature on
rent sharing, among others. The basic observation emerging from this literature is pretty
simple,  and  well  established  empirically:  wages  generally  depend  on  some  firms
characteristics, like profits per worker, ownership status, etc., beside standard personal
characteristics of  the  workers,  like  human  capital  and  experience.  This  raises  an
interesting puzzle, because the textbook competitive model predicts that this should not
happen:  workers should be paid their opportunity wage, nothing more. Therefore, this
type of empirical result calls for a theoretical interpretation within a new framework.
2 The two-round  survey was commissioned  by the World Bank within the RPED project, and was conducted
under Jean-Paul Azam's direction.
2Three, not exclusive, sets of theories have been used for explaining these results.
In the competitive paradigm, the main hypothesis liable to explain the observed positive
correlation between wages and profitability rests on self-selection: more profitable firms
attract workers who are better endowed with unobserved ability, so that profits enter wage
equations as a proxy for the latter. Krueger and Summers (1988) dismiss this argument on
the grounds that unobserved ability should not matter much, after controlling for human
capital, tenure, etc. Teal (1996) controls for such effects by running firm-level panel
regressions, with firm-specific random effects, explaining the average wage paid by each
firm. The remaining impact of profitability on wages is then regarded as a pure time-
series effect, capturing only rent-sharing effects, provided the self-selection effect does
not change over time. This  argument would be doubtful for a panel covering a  long
period of time, but is appropriate for panels with a very short time horizon. However, this
approach might confuse the impact of the composition of the labor force by skill or by
occupation, which affects the average wage, with an impact on the wages themselves, if
there is a positive correlation between profitability and the ratio between the numbers of
skilled and unskilled workers, or between high-ranking and low-ranking occupations in
the sample. We therefore restrict our analysis to individual  wages in the following.
Some brands of efficiency-wage theories, but by no means all of them, can also
account for a relationship between the wages paid and the firm's  characteristics. For
example, the Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), is consistent
with firm-specific wage effects, if the monitoring technology is different from one firm to
the other. If the more profitable firms are the ones where the workers' level of effort are
the most difficult to monitor, e.g. because their technology is more sophisticated, then
they should also pay the highest wages in order to provide the right incentives. This can
be  tested  empirically  by  including  on  the  right-hand  side  various  measurable
characteristics  of  the  monitoring  technology  used  in  the  firm,  like  the  ratio  of
management and supervisory staff to production workers (Azam and Lesueur, 1997). On
the contrary, the nutrition-based efficiency-wage model cannot be  used to explain the
relationship between wages and firms characteristics, as the wage paid only depends on
the  worker's  personal  nutrition-efficiency relationship.  Within  the  efficiency-wage
framework, the high wage is, so to speak, imposed on the worker, and the high wages
cause the high profits.
On the contrary, many models emphasize the bargaining strength of the workers,
not necessarily through union power, to model cases where high wages are imposed on
firms. In these cases, the wage actually paid contains a rent-sharing element, in addition
to the opportunity wage. Then large profits entail high wages. In fact, the use of the term
'rent'  in this context is misleading, as this property holds even in the limiting case where
the worker's bargaining power falls to zero, in a principal-agent model 3. Konings and
3 Assume that the worker spends a verifiable effort level ei and produces Of  per unit of effort. She is paid wv
and gets a utility level wx  - I/2  (e 1)2. Her reservation utility is ui,  so that the finrn  maximizes Of  ei - wi s.t. wi -
1/2  (e)2 > ui. Then her equilibrium wage is:  w; =  +  V 2 (o)
2
. The term  (Of)
2,  which is increasing in the
firm's productivity, could be  misinterpreted as a rent-sharing term, although the worker is stuck on her
3Walsh (1994) have used the different implications of the efficiency-wage and rent-sharing
models to try and disentangle these two effects in the UK. We provide some tests in the
same vein in the following.
In addition, we test for the impact of 'hold-up effects', as analyzed theoretically by
Grout (1984), and emphasized recently in the 'incomplete contract'  literature (see e.g.
MacLeod and  Malcomson, 1993). This  is  a  test that  we  have  not  seen  performed
empirically before. A theoretical analysis of this problem is provided in the appendix,
showing the  theoretical impact of  the  firm's  investment level  on  wages  when  the
bargaining with the workers is open to re-negotiation. Our result suggest that this effect is
possibly significant in the case of C6te d'Ivoire, adding to the Lewisian effect mentioned
above a new channel of impact whereby the bargaining strength of the urban workers
might put a brake on the expansion of the modem sector.
In the case of C6te d'Ivoire, Azam and Lesueur (1997) have tested an extension of
the Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model on some Ivorian data from the  formal industrial
sector, different from the ones used here, with some success. However, they do not test
any rent-sharing effect. Other aspects of the Ivorian labor market have been analyzed
empirically in the literature. Levy and Newman (1989) used the data from two Labor
Force  surveys, performed in  1979 and  1984 to  test wage  flexibility. They estimate
earnings functions for these two years, including some firms'  characteristics, and show
that the recession of the early 1980s induced a downward shift of the whole earnings
schedule, while  this  flexibility was  hidden by  the  fact  that,  on  average, worker's
characteristics improved over  the  same period, resulting in  a  higher  average wage.
Hoddinott (1996) has  used the  CILSS data 4 to  test  for  a  'wage-curve'  effect,  a  la
Blanchflower and Oswald (1995), finding a  significant negative impact of  the local
unemployment  rate on wages. We test for similar effects with our data in the following.
The paper is presented as follows. The next section presents briefly the data, and
the special econometric problems that they raise. Then, the different possible theories are
briefly discussed and tested in turn, by increasing order of complexity. Section 3 presents
the tests performned  with individual wage levels, using a  standard Mincerian earnings
function, restricting the right-hand side  variables to  personal characteristics (Mincer,
1974). Section 4 presents different tests using firm-specific data on the right-hand side, in
addition to  the personal characteristics of the workers, in  order  to  gauge the  likely
importance of the rent-sharing and the hold-up effects discussed briefly above, and to test
them against efficiency-wage  effects.
2. The Data
participation  constraint,  with no rent involved  (see Salanie, 1997). For example, Van Reenen (1996)
emphasizes productivity change as the main source of rent sharing. Hence, the 'rent-sharing' problem may
simply be due to the simplistic way of modeling the worker's reservation utility in simple models.
4 C6te d'Ivoire Living Standard Survey, covering the years 1985-87.
4The data set used here comes from a survey of about 270 manufacturing firms in
Cote d'Ivoire, most of them being interviewed twice. They only belong to four production
sectors (wood, metal, textile and clothing, food and agro-industry). The firms have been
selected at random from a sample frame made from different lists of firms, obtained from
different fiscal authorities (national and  local). The panel  is predominantly made  of
formal sector firms, located in Abidjan, the economic capital city. However, we also have
some informal sector firms, and some semi-formal sector firms in the sample, exclusively
located in Abidjan. The latter refers to a set of firms, which do not pay national taxes, but
lobby the government with a view to obtain various advantages. They are organized in a
relatively powerful association. In Cote d'Ivoire, all the firms pay at least the local tax,
called 'la patente',  but  few of them pay the national taxes. This sampling procedure
entails a risk of endogenous stratification,  insofar as the sampling rate is much larger for
bigger firms, that are easier to locate from fiscal sources, than for smaller ones. In what
follows, this  is taken care of by using weighted least squares, the weights being the
inverse of an estimate of the probability of each worker belonging to the sample, itself a
function of the probability of its firm being drawn in the sample. Moreover, only the
firms from the three cities of greater Abidjan (mainly), Bouake and San Pedro have been
interviewed, while firms in the North of the country have not been visited, in order to
reduce the cost of the survey. The firms have been visited in early 1995 and early 1996,
for collecting data covering the preceding years. As the CFA franc, the local currency, has
been devalued in January 1994, our data refer to a period of recovery, with an unusual
rate of inflation by the standards of the West African Economic and Monetary Union,
amounting to  about 10 % between the two visits. The consumption price  index has
therefore been used to deflate the wage rates, and the other nominal variables. Table 2
presents the precise definitions and the main features of the variables.
Up to 10 employees have been picked at random in each firm, among the ones
present on the premises on the  day of  our visit. This  is  also  a potential  source of
endogenous stratification, working in the opposite direction to the one mentioned above.
Now, 100 % of the employees of small firms have been interviewed, while the samnpling
rate decreases with the size of the firm. Only a small fraction of the workforce of the
minority of large firms  has thus been interviewed, while the  latter have been over-
sampled. This is taken into account by weighting the data for estimating the equations as
explained above. Some  experimentation has  shown  however  that  the  weighted and
unweighted regressions were very similar. Nevertheless, we systematically use White's
heteroscedasticity consistent t ratios in the following, in order to mitigate any problem of
inference due to this issue.
Our panel of workers is unbalanced, as many of them have been observed only
once. The firms which have only been interviewed once, either in 1995 or in 1996, have
not been excluded from the sample, and their number amounts to less than 10 % of the
firms in each round. It has not always been possible to interview twice the same workers
in some of the firms. A dumrnmy  variable is included to control for the possible selection
5bias concerning the workers observed twice (Guillotin and Sevestre, 1994). Moreover, the
panel of individual wages does not allow for the inclusion of unobserved firm-specific
effects, controlling directly for the type of self-selection problems referred to  in  the
introduction.
This structure of the data allows for the use of random-effect models, in order to
account  for  the  unobserved heterogeneity of  the  workers.  The  wage  equations are
estimated by the GLS/1V  method, related to Hausman and Taylor (1981), in order to take
into account the endogeneity of some right-hand side variables. In the result tables that
follow, the instrumented variables are marked with a # superscript. The validity of this
approach has been systematically checked using the Hausman test  (Hausman, 1978),
testing whether the random effects are correlated with the included explanatory variables.
3. The Impact of Personal Characteristics
Since Mincer's classic work (Mincer, 1974), a large share of the applied literature
on wage determination has assumed that employers are able to discover the differences in
productivity between workers, depending on their level of human capital, experience, etc.,
and even the innate ability which economists are unable to observe. Earnings are then
determined to  reflect all  these personal  determinants. Other  observable  differences
between workers, like their different racial or national origin, are also assumed to play a
part. This provides the starting point for the analysis  performed below.
In all the equations presented in table 1, the dependent variable is the log of the
individual net wage, including bonuses and other benefits. The number of individuals is
denoted N,  while thev  number of observations used in each regression is denoted Nb, and
both numbers are presented at the bottom of the table. The difference between them
shows the (relatively small) number of individuals who have been interviewed twice.
They vary naturally from one regression to  the next, because the missing data differ
between questions. Equations (1)  and (2)  in  table  1 are  estimates of  such  standard
Mincerian earning functions, as a background against which to interpret the equations that
follow. As stated above, the t ratios presented are White's  heteroscedasticity consistent
ones (White, 1980). Equation (2) differs from equation (1) by the inclusion of 23 dummy
variables for capturing the production sector effects, as well as the effects of professional
categories (occupation), ranging from unskilled workers to management staff. Inclusion
of the latter does not change much the outcome, but improves the R2 .
We see that the standard human capital variables, education, experience, and its
square, have the expected sign, but that the former is only significant at equation (2). The
education variable is measured by the number of years spent at school, and is always
instrumented in  the GLS/1V equations, in  order to take  due account of  the potential
endogeneity caused by the simultaneous impact of the worker's unobserved innate ability
on both the wage rate and the level of school achievement.  This problem is present in all
the equations presented, where the GLS/IV equation is systematically preferred by the
6Hausman test to a simple GLS approach. Notice that the estimated rate of return is larger
and significant after controlling for the professional categories. This probably reflects the
fact that the 'filtering-down' process, brought out by Knight and Sabot (1990) in the case
of Kenya and Tanzania, is controlled for by the inclusion of the professional categories
dummy variables. This process refers to the problem raised by the fact that the same level
of education does not open access to the same types of jobs  for different cohorts. Just
after independence, any secondary education diploma would have opened access to some
jobs  that require now, for the younger generations, a University degree. This effect is
likely to cause an attenuation bias, due to a measurement error, when estimating the rate
of return to education without controlling for the filtering-down effect. Nevertheless, the
'education' variable is out-performed  in all the subsequent equations, when various firms'
characteristics are included.
The effect of the dummy variable 'West-African immigrant' is not significant in
these equations, nor  in  any of the following ones. Hence, it seems that  there is no
evidence of discrimination against the non Ivorian African workers. This is an important
finding, as C6te d'Ivoire is a traditional country of immigration (Azam and Morrisson,
1994). It is estimated that about 50 % of the population of Abidjan, and 25 % of the
whole population in the country, is of foreign origin. Most of the migrants come from
Burkina Faso and Mali, while there are significant minorities from Ghana, Guinea and
S6n6gal. We do not either  find significant evidence of gender discrimination, as the
estimated earnings advantage of males over females is never significant. This negative
results do not seem to be due to some correlation between the gender or national origin
variables and some firm-specific variables such that, for example, more profitable firms
would employ more male labor, as they are robust to the inclusion of the various firm-
specific variables that follow.
A surprising result is that married workers seem to earn less than single ones, in
most of the equations presented. This is at variance with the hypothesis discussed by
Mazumdar (1983), who  argues that married workers, being more stable in their job,
should earn more. A potential explanation for our unexpected result would follow another
efficiency wage argument: married workers consume a smaller fraction of their income
than single ones, as  they have to  share  with  their family. Hence,  if  there  exists a
consumption-efficiency relationship, as analyzed in Azam (1997), then single workers
should display a steeper wage-efficiency trade-off, inducing the firms to pay them more.
Moreover, this sign seems to be robust to the inclusion of various firm-specific variables,
as shown below.
The  'training'  variable, which  captures vocational  training,  turns  out  to  be
significant,  with a positive sign, in most of the equations that follow, thus outperforming
the 'education' variable discussed above. The 'apprentice' variable indicates if the worker
has been an apprentice before in the same sector or the same firmn,  and it has a surprising
negative impact, which is however almost never significant, except at equations (8) and
in the final model (14). This suggests that some social stigrna might follow from learning
one's job  as an apprentice, rather than, probably, as a  family helper or at school. The
7number of  hours worked  during the week  does not  seem to  have a  consistent  and
significant impact. Lastly, the fact of having a good track record, as captured by the
information that the worker has never been fired before, has a significant positive impact.
We now turn our attention to the incremental impact of different firm-specific
variables, in  order to  capture rent-sharing or  efficiency-wage effects,  as well of  the
potential impact of recent investments by the firm, the latter aiming at capturing some
hold-up effect.
4. The Impact of Firm-Specific Variables
Equation (3) starts the sequence of tests of the impact of firm-specific variables on
individual wages. Most of the comments made above carry over to this equation, as far as
the effects of personal characteristics are concerned. Notice however that the coefficient
of the education variable looses significance. This suggests that this variable is correlated
with some of the firm-specific variables included, in particular its age and its location in
Abidjan. This comment extends to most of the subsequent equations. We see that the age
of the firm seems to have a positive and significant impact, as does the Abidjan dummy
variable. It does not seem to matter whether a share of the capital is owned by the state, as
the 'public' dummy is not significant.  However, this is not very robust, as shown by some
of  the  results  that  follow. Hence,  among the  firms  characteristics included  in  this
equation, only the  dummy indicating if  there is  some  foreign capital in  the  firm is
significant, with a positive sign. This is a predictable effect, which can be rationalized in
different ways (e.g. Teal, 1996). But is not robust either. Nevertheless, some firm-specific
variable  always  turn  out  significant in  these  equations,  suggesting  that  a  purely
competitive model is unable to explain wage determination in the Ivorian manufacturing
sector, as the latter would not allow for any firm-specific explanatory variable. We now
try to identify more precisely the channels of impact of these firm-specific variables.
The Rent-Sharing Effect
Equation (4) is an attempt at capturing more directly the rent-sharing effect, by
taking into account both the level of competition that the firm faces in the market for its
main product, measured simply by the declared number of competitors, and the level of
profit per  worker 5. The  latter turns  out  to  be  significant, while the  former is  not 6.
Moreover, the 'profit per employee' variable is significant even after controlling for the
state of competition faced by the firms in their product markets, suggesting that the latter
does not play a crucial part in determining the outcome. However, this does not answer
the question about the source of this rent-sharing effect raised in the introduction:  is it
5 The appendix presents a theoretical model of rent-sharing with or without re-negotiation, which spells out
analytically  the verbal discussion in the text.
6 The small numerical value of this coefficient is not a source of worry,  as the sample mean of profit per
worker is 0.24 E+07 (see table 2).
8imposed on the firms by the bargaining power of the workers, or is it part of the firm's
incentive system ?
In order to provide some indirect evidence on this issue, equation (5) drops the
profit variable, with a view to disentangle to some extent, in a reduced form way, the
impacts of internal and external pressures. Internal pressures are represented by a dummy
variable taking the value one if there is at least one union in the firm, by the share of
tenured  staff  in  the  workforce  ('permanent'),  and  by  the  seniority variable,  which
measures the number of years spent by the worker in the current job.  The latter two
variables should capture 'insider effects', a la Nickell-Wadhwani. Both the presence of
the union and the seniority effects are significant, suggesting that the bargaining power of
the workers matters. External pressures are represented by two variables at equation (6),
the 'alternative wage' variable, which is the average wage paid by the firms in the same
sector of activity, and the 'employment change' variable, which is the average number of
firings effected by the firms in the same sector of activity. The latter variable is used as a
proxy for the tension on the relevant labor market, with a view to capture indirectly some
kind of 'wage curve' a la Blanchflower-Oswald.  The alternative wage variable seems to
be the main effect, while the employment change variable seems to be an unsatisfactory
proxy for the wage-curve effect, as it does not reproduce the significant impact found by
Hoddinott (1996), and comes here with the wrong sign. This suggests that wages are
higher in sectors where firings are more frequent, capturing probably some differences in
manpower management strategy across sectors. This might also capture some counter-
cyclical 'labor hoarding' effect, whereby firms provide some job  protection when the
workers have few outside opportunities, and feel less moral pressure to keep them when
the market is more tense, firing them only when their chances of finding an equivalent  job
are higher. When comparing the impact of the internal and external pressures variables, at
equation (7), it is pretty clear that they are jointly  significant. Hence, the bargaining
power of the workers, if any, derives both from their outside opportunities offered by the
market, and from institutional features or unionization.
Equation (8)  encompasses the four previous ones, by including both the rent-
sharing effects and the internal and external pressures. It turns out that both the profit
variable and the internal and external pressure variables are  significant, as could be
expected from the rent-sharing theory 7. Moreover, the estimate of the coefficient of the
profit variable is basically unchanged between equation (4) and equation (8), suggesting
that the profit variable itself is not significantly correlated with the included internal and
external pressures variables.
These results suggest that the bargaining power of the workers should be taken
seriously, and is plausibly slowing down the development of the manufacturing sector in
C6te d'Ivoire. The next set of tests gives a chance to the opposing view, that high wages
are the result of the firm's choice to enhance efficiency  by paying high wages.
7 The theoretical model presented in the appendix spells out why we expect to find both the profit per
worker term and the outside wage effect included in a wage model based on bargaining.
9Efficiency-Wage Effects
Equation (9) starts a sequence of equations that turn to the analysis of efficiency-
wage effects, with a view to test whether the correlation between wages and profitability
results from the reverse causation from high wages on high profits, via the effect of the
former  on  productivity, in  a  reduced-form way.  The  strong  information symmetry
assumption implicit in the Mincerian model is dropped first, in order to test an aspect of
the Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model. In this model, firms use high wages as a means to
increase the value of the threat of firing, in a setting where the probability of being caught
shirking is less than one. However, in the original version of this model, the monitoring
technology is  assumed  exogenously given. Azam  and  Lesueur (1997),  following in
particular Eaton and White  (1983), have extended this model by  making monitoring
endogenous.  Assuming  that  the  probability  of  being  caught  shirking  is  positively
correlated with the ratio  of the management and  supervisory staff to  the number of
production workers, called the hierarchy ratio, they show in their theoretical model that
the latter affects negatively the wages paid by a firm, as firms trade-off between pay and
supervision. In equation (9), this variable is borderline significant, with the wrong sign.
Another interesting proxy for the difficult observation of the workers'  effort is provided
by the variable 'complexity of production' used at equations (10) and (11). This is a
dummy variable taking the value one if the firm uses a foreign license, or uses some
technical assistance. Within the 'shirking' paradigm, one expects this variable to have a
positive impact, as the firm is induced to pay higher wages, the more difficult it is to
observe the worker's effort level (see Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani, 1989). This variable
is  strongly significant, with  the expected positive  sign, in  equations (10)  and  (12),
although it is included in the latter along with the hierarchy ratio. Another candidate
among the efficiency wage theories is tested at equation (12), namely the turnover-cost
approach (Salop, 1979). Here, the turnover rate is represented by the ratio of the number
of  workers fired, hired,  or  quitting, over  the total  workforce  of the  firm.  It  is not
significant in  this  equation,  in  which  all  the  variables  representing  the  different
efficiency-wage theories are jointly included, and only the 'complexity' variable survives.
Notice that in this equation, some of the control variables have seen their effect changed,
like the  'married'  dummy, which gets  a positive  sign, as expected  from Mazumdar
(1983). Hence, the  efficiency-wage approach, of the  shirking  type, is  not  definitely
rejected, although the results are somehow mixed.
Before performing an encompassing test of these different approaches, we now
provide a test of the hold up effect, which we have not seen tested empirically in the
literature. It captures another aspect of the bargaining power of the workers, in addition to
the rent-sharing effect discussed in the references cited above.
10Holdup Theory
Equation (13) is an attempt at testing the 'hold up'  theory, which has not been
given so far  the attention it deserves in the  empirical literature  on labor economics
(Grout, 1984, MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993). This theory plays potentially a crucial
part in  providing some  finer foundations for  the widely accepted use  of bargaining
models in  the  theory of  wage  determination. The  rent-sharing theory assumes that
bargaining occurs because of the power of the insiders or of the trade unions to impose a
credible threat of reducing the firm's profits to zero, by stopping production. Then, the
bargaining equilibrium may be assumed either efficient (McDonald and Solow, 1981), or
inefficient as in the 'right to manage' model (Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990). In the former
case, the contract between the firm and the representative worker is assumed complete,
and not open to re-negotiation. In the latter case, i.e. the 'right to manage' model, the firm
is assumed to be unable to pre-commit to any level of employment agreed in advance
with  the  union,  so that  a  credibility constraint is  imposed  on  the  choices open  to
bargaining, holding firms 'on their demand curve'. However, once agreed, the wage rate
is not supposed to be open to re-negotiation. This model only leads to a more complicated
rent-sharing effect, without yielding any significantly  different testable prediction.
In the hold-up framework, the possibility of re-negotiation of both the wage and
employment levels  is at the center of the stage, as presented more rigorously in the
appendix. The test case in this framework is what happens after the firm has invested in a
new specific asset. Were complete contracts possible, then the firm would negotiate ex
ante some labor contracts with the workers, and the wage rate would not be affected by
the subsequent investment outlay. However, if contracts are incomplete, then the new
investment opens the possibility for workers to re-negotiate the wage agreement, and get
a  share  of  the  investment-induced surplus,  depending  on  their  bargaining  power.
Obviously, this possibility of re-negotiating depends crucially on the investment being
reversible only at a high cost, otherwise the workers could not capture any part of the
incremental profit.  In  our  data  set, we  have  some  information on  the  most  recent
investment outlay  done  by  the  firms.  We  can  distinguish between  equipment and
buildings. Assuming that the latter are less specific than the former, i.e. that the second-
hand market for equipment is much less developed in Cote d'Ivoire than the second-hand
building market, as seems plausible, we can thus use the arnount invested in the former as
a test variable. This is done in isolation in equation (13), and it is seen to be insignificant
in this case8. However, the next test suggests that this failure is due to the fact that this
test variable should rather be included alongside the rent-sharing effect, where it becomes
highly significant.
8 Boucq (1998) performs a similar test with the same data, using a different specification of the wage
equation, and finds a significant hold-up effect, like we do in the next equation presented.
'11The Encompassing  Equation
Equation (14) is an 'eclectic'  equation, encompassing all the different theories
tested here. In this equation, we find that many standard personal characteristics variables
discussed above are significant with the expected sign, with the exception of education,
while 'married' has the unexpected sign discussed above. Notice that gender is again not
significant. Then we have institutional variables like age of the firm and foreign share of
capital, which both  have  a  positive impact. All  the  'efficiency-wage'  variables  are
significant, but 'supervision' has the wrong sign, relative to the prediction of a 'shirking'
model. The profit per  employee variable is  still present, supporting the rent-sharing
approach, although with a lower significance level. In this  eclectic equation, the only
internal pressures variable that remains significant is the 'insider' effect, contrary to what
was found before, while the external pressures variables, previously significant, loose
here  most  of  their  significance, with  the  employment  change  effect  keeping  the
unexpected sign discussed above. However, the union variable becomes insignificant.
Maybe, this is a reflection of the actual role of the Ivorian unions, sometimes described as
'collaborative unions',  emanating from the (then) ruling party for keeping the workers
under control (Toure, 1986). However, this may also be a statistical artifact, due to the
'eclectic' character of this equation, as it was significant at equations (5), (7) and (8). The
most  drastic change in  this  equation is  that  the hold-up  variable becomes  strongly
significant. Hence, the  encompassing equation provides  a  pretty  unexpected picture,
which accommodates both some efficiency-wage effects, although 'supervision' has the
wrong sign, and some effects of the bargaining power of the workers, including both a
rent-sharing and  a  hold-up  effects.  Of course,  one  must  exert  some  caution  when
interpreting the results of this equation, because of its 'eclectic'  nature, including many
explanatory variables that might entail some multi-collinearity problems. Nevertheless, it
seems to confirm that the rent-sharing and hold-up approaches are robust to the inclusion
of efficiency-wage effects, and it thus provides some support to the view that urban-sector
workers have some bargaining power that might retard development, somehow in the
Lewis tradition, but with an additional contract-incompleteness  effect.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the determinants of wages in the manufacturing
sector of Cote d'Ivoire, with a view to identify whether the high wages paid in this sector,
by the standards of low-income countries, are a hindrance to industrial development, or
the result of the relatively good performances of the local firms. After controlling for
standard Mincerian personal characteristics, we find that several firm-specific variables
are significant. The rent-sharing effect of profit per worker turns out to be significant and
robust. We have tried a large number of combinations of included explanatory variables,
finding that the profit term is always significant, when included. The alternative wage,
computed as the average wage per production sector, seems to exert a relatively robust
external pressure on wages. This is consistent both with a competitive model, and with a
12bargaining model, insofar as this is a measure of the outside options open to the worker.
On the contrary, we have been unable to capture the kind of wage-curve effect found by
Hoddinott (1996), using as a proxy the average number of firings taking place in the same
sector. This does not seem to affect manufacturing  wages in C6te d'Ivoire in the expected
way.
Although the shirking model of efficiency wage is not entirely rejected by our
data, as the complexity of the production process is significant in some equations, it does
not seem to be as robust as the rent-sharing theory. Moreover, this variable might also
find an interpretation within a bargaining framework, if the complexity of the production
technology turns out to enhance the bargaining power of the workers. The other brand of
efficiency-wage model  tested here, the turnover model,  is  not  rejected  in  the  most
encompassing  equation.
Hence,  our  results  seem  to  lean  cautiously  in  favor  of  the  rent-sharing
interpretation of wage determination in the Ivorian manufacturing sector, in particular
because the 'supervision effect' seems to work in the wrong way. The bargaining power
of the workers seems to come from standard insider or union effects, although the direct
inclusion of the rent-sharing and hold-up effects seem to out-perform these explanatory
variables. Moreover, the bargaining power of the workers seems to reach the point where
they are able to impose some ex-post  re-negotiation of the wage agreements in response
to new investment by the firm, as the test of the hold-up theory turns out to be significant
in the encompassing equation. This may be regarded as an additional and independent
result in the literature that points at institutional weaknesses as an important brake on
industrial development in poor countries, as illustrated by Knack and Keefer (1997) and
Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1998). Improving the institutional framework, with a view
to  better protect  the  returns  to  investment, might thus  be  the  most  pressing policy
challenge to be faced in Cote d'Ivoire, and probably also in other poor countries, in order
to speed up the development of the manufacturing sector.
13Table 1: Individual Wage Equations
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Intercept  0. 319  0.283  0.236  0.285
(2.86)-*  (12.88)-*  (8.52)-*  (10.24)-
Education#  0.086  0.112  0.051  0.028
(0.40)  (3.04)***  (1.02)  (0.69)
Experience  0.090  0.068  0.076  0.092
(6.20)***  (2.10)**  (2.30)**  (2.79)*
Experience 2 -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002
(6.31)***  (1.88)*  (1.52)  (2.65)*
West African immigrant  -0.066  -0.059  0.121  0.140
(0.09)  (0.13)  (0.19)  (0.28)
Gender  0.237  0.343  0.181  0.317
(0.51)  (1.34)  (0.61)  (1.06)
Married  -0.082  -0.109  -0.081  -0.083
(4.42)***  (3.47)***  (2.28)**  (2.66)***
Apprentice#  -0.148  0.610  -0.990  -1.077
(0.05)  (0.63)  (1.02)  (1.43)
Weekly hours worked  -0.009  -0.005  -0.004  -0.011
(0.42)  (1.47)  (1.03)  (2.63)***
Training  0.117  0.066  0.074  0.061
(2.44)***  (2.33)**  (2.03)**  (1.99)*
Notfired#  0.070  0.161  0.149  0.156
(1.53)  (2.96)***  (2.57)***  (2.74)**
Sector  and occupation  Dummy  no  yes  yes  yes
variables
Finns Characteristics
Age  - - 0.010  0.009
(2.08)**  (1.86)*
Foreign  - - 0.305  0.491
(1.17)  (1.88)*
Public  - - 0.074  0.333
(0.719)  (2.62)***
Abidjan  - - 0.890  1.230
(1.71)*  (2.48)***
Product Market Effects
Competition  - - 0.242
(3.09)***
Profit/n#  1-  - 1.98E-08
(3.11)***
N  909  909  878  793
Nb of observations  1135  1135  1100  956
R  2  0.06  0.59  0.62  0.66
Note:  Significance  levels  ***  1%;  *  5%; *  10°%.
14(5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Intercept  0.188  0.039  0.261  0.359
(5.94)***  (0.25)  (1.73)*  (1.99)**
Education"  0.065  0.072  0.040  0.038
(0.80)  (2.21)**  (0.89)  (1.18)
Experience  0.083  0.038  -0.040  -0.079
(2.62)***  (1.19)  (1.26)  (2.66)***
Experience 2 -0.002  -0.006  -0.001  -0.002
(2.35)***  (0.74)  (1.26)  (2.64)***
West African immigrant  0.150  -0.257  -0.240  -0.139
(0.26)  (0.94)  (0.81)  (0.53)
Gender  0.002  0.204  0.128  0.232
(0.04)  (1.16)  (0.51)  (0.96)
Married  -0.045  -0.020  -0.026  -0.032
(1.18)  (0.56)  (0.67)  (0.89)
Apprentice#  -0.240  -0.114  -1.087  -1.109
(0.24)  (0.20)  (1.42)  (1.93)**
Weekly hours worked  0.006  -0.009  0.007  0.013
(0.14)  (2.18)**  (1.77)*  (3.03)***
Training  0.084  0.063  0.095  0.082
(1.62)*  (1.59)*  (1.50)  (1.34)
Notfired#  0.172  0.129  0.179  0.121
Firins  Charactetistics(3.21)***  (1.83)*  (2.62)***  (1.69)*
Firms Characteristics
Age  0.002  0.001  0.007  0.005
(0.59)  (0.28)  (1.69)*  (1.35)
Foreign  0.479  0.152  0.137  0.052
(1.45)  (0.92)  (0.57)  (0.24)
Public  -0.031  0.271  0.290  0.486
(0.30)  (2.67)**  (2.64)***  (3.78)***
Abidjan  1.014  0.518  0.268  0.373
(1.84)*  (1.74)*  (0.77)  (1.28)
Product Market Effects
Competition  - - - 0.207
(3.15)***
Profit/n#  - - - 1.73E-08
(4.60)***
Internal Pressures
Union infirm  0.470  - 0.365  0.345
(3.33)***  (3.08)***  (2.66)***
Permanent  -0.579  - -0.349  -0.295
(1.24)  (1.08)  (0.92)
Seniority#  0.043  - 0.029  0.029
(2.78)***  (2.12)*  (2.29)**
External Pressures
Log alternative wage  - 0.749  0.469  0.443
(3.35)***  (2.02)**  (2.11)**
Log employment change  - 0.247  0.234  0.200
(3.70)***  (3.72)***  (3.37)***
N  748  878  748  676
Nb of observations  915  1100  915  795
R 2  0.71  0.62  0.67  0.70
l5(9)  (10)  (12)  (13)
Intercept  0.231  0.223  0.215  0.306
(818)**  (933)***  (8.90)***  (4.18)***
Education#  0.040  0.051  0.059  0.098
(0.75)  (1-09)  (1.25)  (1.39)
Experience  0.618  0.041  0.040  0.123
(0.04)  (1.28)  (1.29)  (1.90)**
Experience 2 -0.001  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003
(1.22)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (1.75)*
West African immigrant  0.077  0.394  0.341  0.142
(0.12)  (1.15)  (0.99)  (0.27)
Gender  0.232  0.032  0.015  0.253
(0.78)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.57)
Married  -0.083  -0.070  0.059  -0.123
(2.31)**  (2.01)**  (1.82)*  (2.90)-**
Apprentice#  -1.057  -0.077  0.142  0.750
(1.04)  (0.09)  (0.18)  (0.49)
Weekly hours worked  -0.005  4.78L 05  0.008  -0.009
(1.15)  (0.01)  (0.21)  (0.18)
Training  0.075  0.070  0.060  0.131
(1.91)**  (2.01)  (1.76)*  (1.22)
Notfired#  0.149  0.083  0.075  0.233
(2.66)***  (1.57)*  (1.46)  (3.47)***
Firms Characteristics
Age  0.010  0.006  0.002  0.014
(1.94)**  (0.17)  (0-05)  (1.45)
Foreign  0.273  0.092  0.110  -0.618
(0.95)  (0.39)  (0.64)  (1.05)
Public  0.074  0.036  -0.061  0.188
(0.70)  (0.38)  (0.66)  (0.78)
Abidjan  0.827  0.677  0.683  0.137
(1.49)  (1.42)  (1.43)  (0.19)
Efficiency Wage Theories
Supervision  0.059  0.047  0.050
(1.66)*  (1.35)  (1.43)
Complexity  of production  0.875  0.854
technology  (4.07)-  (4.02)*
turnover  - -0.089
(0.81)
Hold up Theory
Specific  investment  - - - 5.12E-11
(0.77)
N  878  866  866  663
Nb of observations  1100  1082  1082  772
k 
2 0.63  0.71  0.71  0.67
16(14) Encompassing  Model
Intercept  0.456  (4.30)***
Education#  0.007  (0.26)
Experience  0.106  (3.70)-*
Experience 2 -0.003  (4.06)***
West African  immigrant  -0.137  (0.47)
Gender  0.315  (1.10)
Married  -0.075  (1.91)**
Apprentice#  -1.573  (1.91)'
Weekly  hours  worked  -0.004  (1.13)
Training  0.134  (2.09)**
Notfired#  0.203  (2.83)***
Firms Characteristics
Age  0.009  (1.66)*
Foreign  0.415  (1.91)**
Public  0.057  (0.44)
Abidjan  0.457  (1.30)
Efficiency Wage Theories
Supervision  0.126  (2.12)**
Complexity  of production  0.885  (5.20)*
technology
turnover  -0.361  (2.49)***
Product Market Effects
Competition  0.063  (1.32)
Profit/ n#  4.43E_09  (1.86)*
Internal Pressures
Union infirm  0.082  (0.81)
Permanent  0.166  (2.16)**
Seniority#  0.003  (0.28)
External Pressures
Log  alternative  wage  0.160  (0.91)
Log  employmnent  change  0.107  (1.74)*
Hold up Theory
Specific investment  1.17E-10  (3.38)**
N  481
Nb of observations  538
R 2  0.83
17Table 2:  Definitions and  Sample Characteristics of the Variables
Name  definition  I'  ao  Nb
Individual  Variables
log-wage  logarithm of the net wage, bonuses and benefits included,  11.37  0.83  1,568
before deduction of loan repayments
gender  = 1 if the employee is a male  0.90  0.29  1,613
West African  = 1 if the employee is coming from a West African country,  0.18  0.39  1,613
except Cote d'Ivoire
experience  working experience, measured as the current age minus the  16.36  8.49  1,208
school-leaving age and the duration of any unemployment
spell
exp2  square of experience  339.9  329.9  1,208
education  school-leaving age minus 6 years  12.77  4.98  1,202
apprentice  = 1 if the employee has been an apprentice in the same  0.27  0.44  1,609
sector or frm
married  = 1 if the employee is married  0.31  0.46  1,613
permanent  =1 if the employee is a permanent employee  0.97  0.15  1,605
training  = 1 if the employee  gets some on-the-job training  0.034  0.18  1,592
fired  = 1 if the employee has never been fired  0.24  0.42  1,572
seniority  Number of years spent in the current job  7.65  6.73  1,613
sector experience  = 1 if the employee has worked before in another firm in the  0.38  0.48  1,613
same sector
Firm-specific  variables
competition  NumbeT  of competitors of the firm for its first product  3.69  1.40  426
supervision  ratio of the number of management and supervisory staff to  0.15  0.14  247
total workforce
turnover  ratio of the sum of the numbers of hired, fired or quitting  0.32  0.46  271
employees during the last year to total workforce
complexity of  =1 if the firm holds a foreign license or uses technical  0.14  0.34  419
production  assistance
technology
permanent  share of permanent staff in total workforce  0.87  0.24  427
union  = 1, if there is at least one union in the firm  0.43  0.49  387
alternative wage  logarithm of the average wage paid by the firms in the  11.36  0.32  373
sample belonging to the same sector of production
employment change  average number of firings during the preceding year in the  2.77  1.53  348
sample firms belonging to the same production sector
profit / n  gross  profit,  before  depreciation  and taxes,  divided  by the  0.24E+07  0.8 1E+7  272
nurnber of employees
human capital  average human capital in the firm = mean of the education  2.00  1.03  348
level in the firm
specific investment  value of the most recent investment in material and  0.18E+09  0.68E+09  272
equipment
age  Number of year of existence of the firm  15.6  13.67  424
foreign  = 1, if the capital of the firm is more than 50% foreign  0.57  0.49  464
public  = 1, if the firm has some public capital  0.02  0.14  464
Abidjan  = I if the firm is based in Abidjan  0.87  0.32  464
18Appendix : Rent-Sharing  with or without Re-Negotiation
Assume that the workers are risk neutral, and are represented by  a formal or
informal union, with a utilitarian objective function:
U= wL  + (M- L) w,  (A.1)
where w is the wage rate paid by the firm, w the alternative wage, L the workforce in the
firm, supposed to be all members of the union, and M the total number of members,
including those who are going not to get a job  in the firm. The outside option of all the
workers is to work in the outside labor market, and earn w M.
Denoting r the rental rate of capital, and K the capital stock invested, define:
r=F(K, L) -wL  - rK  (A.2)
as the profit of the firm when production takes place, where F(K, L) is a well-behaved
production function, with decreasing returns to scale. In the absence of re-negotiation, the
firm's outside option is zero profit.
The Case of Binding Labor Contracts
In the case of binding contracts, the equilibrium triple fw, L, K] is determined by
assuming that the generalized Nash bargaining solution prevails. Denote 0 < a < 1 the
bargaining power of the workers. Then the equilibrium solves:
max  [(w - W)L)a,L'  . (A.3)
w,K,L
The first-order conditions can be arranged to read:
FL (K, L) =  w,  (A.4)
FK (K, L) =r,  (A.5)
and
w=  w  +.  (A.6)
Condition (A.4) shows that the level of employment will only depend on the
alternative wage and the capital stock, and not on the wage actually paid in the firm.
Condition (A.5) is the standard equality between the marginal product of capital and the
19rental rate. Hence, in the absence of re-negotiation, the assumed bargaining power of the
workers does not distort allocative efficiency, for given w and r. Condition (A.6) gives
the wage equation, where the second term on the RHS of equation (A.6) is the rent-
sharing term. It falls to zero if the bargaining power of the workers falls to a = 0.
The Case of Re-Negotiation
The outcome is different if the labor contract is re-negotiable after the investment
is made by the firm. Assume now that K is specific enough, so that it cannot be re-sold
instantly, and that the rental cost r K must be paid in any case, independently of the
output level. Then, the equilibrium triple {w, L, K) is determined in two steps.
First, the firm chooses its capital stock K such that:
maxF(K, LN) -wNLN-  rK,  (A.7)
K
where  {wV, LN}  is determined in a second stage such that:
wN, LN}  = arg max [(w - w)L]a  [ir+  rK]('"a.  (A.8)
w, L
The first-order conditions can then be arranged to read:
FL (KR, LN) =  w,  (A.9)
FK (KR, LN) =  '  r,  (A.10)
I-a
and:
N  a  a  r  a rKR
N=w  + 1  L  + 1  N  (A.ll )
1-all  I-a 7LA.1
Hence, the possibility of re-negotiation introduces a term in KR/LN in the wage
equation, provided  a r > 0.
Notice that equation (A.  10) shows that the marginal product of capital is higher
than the rental rate. If returns to scale are decreasing, this entails a lower level of capital
under re-negotiation, for a given rental rate. This is the hold-up effect proper, which is a
major cause of inefficiency, as it deters investment. However, under constant returns to
scale, this would entail that the rental rate would be lower  in equilibrium under  re-
negotiation than under binding contracts, if the alternative  wage was the same.
Alternatively, the wage equation can be written as:
20w = (1-a)w  + a [F  LN  (A.12)
Therefore, the rent-sharing approach, under re-negotiation, is also consistent with
a wage equation, which expresses the wage rate as a linear combination of the outside
wage  and  the  average product  of  labor.  The  latter effect  can  be  interpreted  as  a
'productivity clause', entailing that a given share of any increase in productivity must be
passed on to the workers. This is quite a common clause in labor contracts, even in the
developing world, at least in the formal sector.
In the case of binding labor contracts, the equivalent of equation (A.  12) is:
-F(KR,  LN  )  KR
w=  (l-a)w  +  a  L  N  -arp-.  (A.13)
In  this  case,  the  'productivity clause'  does  not  include  the share  of  capital.
Therefore, an alternative approach to testing the absence of re-negotiation is to add a term
in KR/LN to a wage equation expressing the wage rate as a linear combination of the
outside wage and the average product of labor, like (A.  12), assuming that the rental rate
of capital is significantly different from zero.
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